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PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES UNDER THE MARYlAND
SURVIVAL STATUTE: ADVOCATING DAMAGE RECOVERY
FOR A DECEDENT'S FUTURE LOST EARNINGS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario: Ms. Evelyn Manning, a fifty
year old woman, drives her car down Route 202 in Prince George's
County, Maryland, when it breaks down. l Moments later, another
vehicle strikes her, pinning her against her disabled vehicle. 2 Assume she is not killed, but instead severely injured, and now seeks a
remedy under Maryland law. Further assume that, due to these injuries, Ms. Manning's future lost earnings3 equal $500,000.
Under Maryland law, Ms. Manning could file an action for personal injury, where she could recover up to $500,000 in damages for
future lost earnings. 4 Further, if Ms. Manning dies soon after receiving this damage award, her estate may retain the entire damage
award under Maryland's estate law. 5 In contrast, now assume that
Ms. Manning dies prior to filing suit. Under current Maryland law,
Ms. Manning's estate, acting as her agent, may bring the same personal injury action under the survival statute, but can not recover
damages for the decedent's future lost earnings. 6
Based on this scenario, an injured party who lives and appears
for trial is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for the de1. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 122,716 A.2d 285, 286 (1998).
2. Id.
3. Future lost earnings are defined as:
Wages, salary, or other income that a person could have earned if he
or she had not lost a job, suffered a disabling irtiury, or died. Lost
earnings are typically awarded as damages in personal-injury and
wrongful-termination cases. There can be past lost earnings and future lost earnings.
BlACK'S LAw DlcnONARY 526 (7th ed. 1999).
4. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-109 (1998). In Maryland, the term
"'economic damages' means loss of earnings and medical expenses." Id.
5. See MD. CODE ANN .. EST. & TRUSTS § 1-301 (1995) ("All property of a decedent
shall be subject to the estates of decedents law, and upon the person's death
shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title

.... ").
6. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
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gree of i~ury sustained. 7 However, if the injured party dies before
trial, that party is not entitled to fair and reasonable compensation
for the degree of injury suffered. s Stated another way, the injured
party, whose earning potential is diminished by the negligence of a
tortfeasor, can be fully compensated for that diminution. Yet, the
victim who dies, having all earning potential eliminated upon death,
is not entitled to compensation under current Maryland law. This
inconsistency is illogical: by causing the death of another, the
tortfeasor's liability is substantially minimized.
Surprisingly, this inconsistency is mandated under Maryland
law. 9 Damages for future lost earnings are not recoverable by the estate of an i~ured party who died as a result of a tortfeasor's conduct. lO Therefore, the decedent's estate is not compensated for the
decedent's future lost earnings, even though the loss occurred as a
result of the tortfeasor's conduct. II
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently upheld this inequity
position in Jones v. Flood. 12 In Jones, the court held that a personal
representative in a survival action may not recover damages for the
decedent's future lost earnings. 13 This glaring injustice requires a
thorough examination of the adoption and interpretation of both
the Maryland survival 14 and wrongful death statutes,15 and the impact the courts' continued reliance on Jones has on injured parties'
estates.
This Comment examines the survival and wrongful death statutes by exploring the types of damages recoverable in a survival action 16 for personal injuries, and proposes a change in the current
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra notes 4547 and accompanying text.
See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
See infra note 44.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
351 Md. 120, 716 A.2d 285 (1998).
See id. at 131, 716 A.2d at 290.
See MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 6401 (1999) (providing that, "[e]xcept
as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a cause of action at law, whether
real, personal, or mixed, survives the death of either party").
15. See MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-902 (1999) (providing that "[a]n action may be maintained against a person whose wrongful act causes the death
of another").
16. See David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages For Pain and Suffering Prior To
Death, 64 N.YU. L. REv. 256, 261 (1989):
Survival acts . . . generally have provided that certain of a decedent's
causes of action survive the death and become the claims of the es-
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application of the law. Part II of this Comment addresses the survival statute, discussing its purposes and the damages currently recoverable under it.17 Part III discusses the wrongful death statute,
highlighting its purpose and the recoverable damages. IS Part IV provides a comparison of the nature and purpose of the survival statute
and the wrongful death statute. 19 Part V discusses the current state
of the law regarding the recovery of future lost earnings in Maryland courts. 20 Part VI illustrates how the plain language and legislative intent of the survival statute is currently ignored. 21 Finally, Part
VII discusses how the perceived problems of double recovery and
stare decisis should not limit a court's granting of future lost earnings in survival actions. 22
II.

THE SURVIVAL STATUTE

A.

Suroival Statutes Generally

Historically at common law, both in Maryland 23 and nation-

17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

tate which the decedent's personal representative may pursue. The
survival acts were enacted in large part to alleviate the situation in
which a decedent had initiated and prosecuted a legal action that
had not proceeded to judgment prior to the death. Upon the death
of the plaintiff; the case would be dismissed. This practice was unfair
to the decedent and her heirs and resulted in an undeserved windfall to the defendant .... Damages under these survival acts have included medical expenses resulting from the injury, lost income, pain
and suffering prior to death, and, in some jurisdictions, loss of enjoyment of life.
[d. A survival action is also defined as "[a] lawsuit brought on behalf of a decedent's estate for injuries or damages incurred by the decedent immediately
before dying." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1459 (7th ed. 1999).
See infra notes 22-47 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 48-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 85-137 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 138-201 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 202-68 and accompanying text.
See Demczuk v. Jenifer, 138 Md. 488, 490, 114 A. 471, 472 (1921) ("The general rule of common law was that, if an injury were done either to the person
or to the property of another, for which unliquidated damages only could be
recovered in satisfaction, the action died with the person to whom or by
whom the wrong was done." (citing HERBERT BROOM, LEGAL MAxIMS 702 (8th
ed. 1911»); see also Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332,
333-34, 65 A. 49, 50 (1906) (holding that the survival statute and wrongful
death statute are two separate and distinct causes of action which allow for
separate and distinct recoveries).
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wide,24 all causes of action initiated by or on behalf of a party ended with the death of that party.25 However, many jurisdictions abrogated the common law by enacting what are commonly referred to
as "survival statutes. "26 Survival statutes provide that claims held by a
person at death are not extinguished; they may be enforced by an
action brought by a successor, usually the decedent's personal
represen tative. 27
While no general federal survival statute exists,28 almost all fIfty
states have enacted some form of survival statute. 29 The approach of
the states that have done so can generally be divided into two categories: (1) those that have entirely rejected the common-law approach by adopting new rules that presume the survival of claims,
with some exceptions;30 and (2) those that have acted more conservatively by "merely add[ing] categories of actions to those that already survived the death of the claimant at common law."31
24. See 1 CJ.S. Abatement and Revival § 117 (1985). It was a principle of common
law that if a person suffered an injury to either the person or property, for
which only damages could be the remedy, the cause of action in correlation
to that injury abates at death. In Latin, this common-law doctrine is actio personalis moritur cum persona. In English this translates to "a personal right of action dies with the person." See Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co., 477 P.2d
511, 512 (Idaho 1970).
25. See Doggett, 977 P.2d at 512.
26. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
27. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 45 (1982).
28. See Michael D. Moberly, For Whom The Bell Tolls: A Decedent's Right to § 1983
Pain and Suffering Damages in the Ninth Circuit, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 409, 413
(2000). See also Miller v. Apartments & Homes of Nj., 646 F.2d 101, 108 (3d
Cir. 1981) (noting "the absence of general federal provisions concerning survival of actions"); Strickland v. Deaconess Hosp., 735 P.2d 74, 77 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987) (commenting that "no federal survival provision exist[s]").
29. See infra note 49.
30. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-462 (2000) ("[A]ll personal claims upon which an action
has been filed, except for injuries to the reputation, survive . . . . "); ALAsKA
STAT. § 09.55.570 (1999) ("All causes of action . . . survive . . . . "); ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (West 2000) ("Every cause of action, except [named exceptions], shall survive . . . . "); CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE § 377.20(a) (West 2000)
("Except as otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action . . . is not lost by
reason of the person's death, but survives . . . . "); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
13-20-101 (West 2000) ("All cause of action, except actions for slander or libel,
shall survive . . . . "); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-599(a) (West 2000) ("A
cause or right of action shall not be lost or destroyed by the death of any person . . . . ").
31. Karen M. Doore, Survival of the Fittest? Waiting Out the Death of the Plaintiff in
ADA Claims: Allred v. Solaray, Inc., 1998 UTAH L. REv. 371, 377-78 (1998); see
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Maryland s Survival StatutlP

Maryland follows the trend of the more aggressive states by rejecting the common-law approach and adopting a new rule that
presumes the survival of claims, with an exception for slander.
1.

Development of Maryland's Survival Statute

The Maryland General Assembly abrogated the common-law
rule when it enacted its first survival statute in 1785. 33 This precursor to the current section 6401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provided that, "' [n]o action of ejectment, waste, partition, dower, replevin, or any personal action, . . . shall abate by the
death of either or any of the parties to such action . . . this not to
apply to actions for slander or for i£Uuries to the person.' "34 In a
special session one year later, the Legislature narrowed the scope of
"injuries," but broadened the class of "personal actions" that would
not abate at plaintiff's death-an action deemed necessary by the
injustices resulting from the Civil War. This class of personal actions
was further enlarged in 1888 when the General Assembly stated,
"[n]o action hereafter brought to recover damages for i£Uuries to
the person by negligence or default shall abate by reason of the
death of the plaintiff, but the personal representatives of the deceased may be substituted as plaintiff and prosecute the suit to final
also ARK. CODE ANN. § H).{'i2-101 (a) (West 1999) ("For wrongs done to the person . . . an action may be maintained . . . . "); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
3704(a) (West 1999) ("No action brought to recover damages for injuries to
the person . . . shall abate . . . . "); IDAHO CODE § 5-327 (West 2000) ("Causes
of action arising out of injury to the person . . . shall not abate . . . .").
32. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6401 (1999). Maryland's survival statute
provides the following:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a cause of
action at law, whether real, personal, or mixed, survives the death of
either party. (b) A cause of action for slander abates upon the death
of either party unless an appeal has been taken from a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff. (c) A right of action in equity survives
the death of either party if the court can grant effective relief in
spite of the death.
Id.
33. The first survival statute enacted by the Maryland Legislature was the Act of
1785, chapter 80, which abrogated the common-law rule for abatement of certain actions.
34. Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 335, 65 A.2d 49, 50
(1906) (quoting Acts 1785, ch. 80, codified as the Code of 1860, art. 2, § 1).
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judgment and satisfaction. "35 Inadvertently omitted from the comprehensive Maryland Code revision of 1957, the survival statute remained "lost" until a corrective bill was enacted in 1963. 36 Fortunately, the code restructure of 1973 placed the statutory provision
within the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, continuing with
the same force and effect despite the modification in language. 37 In
1988, the language was altered, becoming the current version, with
no apparent desire to change the statutory intent. 38 However, the
1988 modification provided for abatement of "actions for injuries to
the person where the defendant dies, and actions for slander. "39
2.

Damages Recoverable Under Maryland's Survival Statute

The purpose of Maryland's survival statute is to provide for the
recovery of damages sustained by the deceased during the decedent's life that would have been recoverable had the deceased survived. 40 A loss to the decedent's estate in a survival action concerns
only damages sustained by the decedent, not for damages sustained
by the decedent's relatives. 41
A survival action limits the personal representative to recovering damages that the decedent sustained during the decedent's
life. 42 Maryland courts, however, limit recovery to include only com35. Stewart, 104 Md. at 335, 65 A.2d at 51 (quoting the Code of Public General
Laws of 1888, art. 75, § 25).
36. See Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 535, 682 A.2d
1143, 1160 (1996) (noting the re-codification in MD. ANN. CODE, art. 75, § 15B
(Supp. 1963), with only minor editorial changes including the deletion of the
word "hereafter" and two extraneous commas».
37. See id. at 535-36, 682 A.2d at 1160 (noting the revision author's intent).
38. See id. at 536 n.21, 682 A.2d at 1160 n.21 (noting the change was signed into
law by the Acts of 1988, ch. 359).
39. Stewart, 104 Md. at 336, 65 A. at 51 (quoting the Code of Public General Laws
of 1888, art. 75, § 24, recodified in the Code of 1904).
40. See id.
41. See id. at 339-40, 65 A. at 52 (stating that damages under each statute "go into
different channels and are recovered upon different grounds ... ").
42. See id. (stating that the damages include those the decedent sustained, but exclude damages sustained by other persons due to the death); see also MD.
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7-401 (y) (Supp. 1999) (providing that the representative may recover funeral expenses if the action is brought against the
tortfeasor whose wrong resulted in the decedent's death); see also ACandS,
Inc. v. Asner, 104 Md. App. 608, 645, 657 A.2d 379, 397 (1995) ("Damages in a
survival action are limited to the damages that would have been recoverable
by the decedent had he survived, i.e., appropriate compensation for the time
between injury and death, which includes loss of consortium damages."), rev'd
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pensation for injury and loss between the time of injury and the
time of death. 43 Such damages include pain and suffering, medical
expenses, funeral expenses, and lost earnings.44 The courts also alon other grounds, 344 Md. 155, 686 A.2d 250 (1996); Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md.
223, 230, 167 A.2d 773, 777 (1961) (noting that damages are limited to those
that might have been recovered by the deceased); Stewart, 104 Md. at 34243,
65 A. at 53 (same).
43. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 126, 716 A.2d 285, 288 (1998) (noting that
Maryland courts have consistently applied the rule that, under the survival
statute, damages are based on those suffered by the decedent from the date
of injury until his or her death (citing Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 274, 279 n.2,
623 A.2d 656, 658 n.2 (1993) (holding that in a Maryland survival action, future earnings are not recoverable»; United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533,
544 n.9, 620 A.2d 905, 909 n.9 (1993) (noting that Maryland's survival statute
allows for compensation only between the time of injury and time of death);
Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 320 Md. 776, 792, 580 A.2d 206, 214
(1990) (commenting that survival action damages include conscious pain and
suffering, but exclude future loss of earnings); Tri-State Poultry Coop. v. Carey, 190 Md. 116, 125, 57 A.2d 812, 817 (1948) (stating that the victim must
have lived after the accident to recover future earnings); White v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 140 Md. 593, 598, 118 A. 77, 79 (1922) (noting that a suit
for future damages could not be maintained if the person causing the injury
was dead); ACandS, 104 Md. App. at 645, 657 A.2d at 397-98 (1995) (noting
that damages in a survival action are limited to those that the decedent could
have recovered had he survived and therefore compensation is only awarded
for the time between the injury and death); Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 76
Md. App. 524,539,547 A.2d 654,661 (1988), vacated on other grounds, 322 Md.
713, 589 A.2d 956 (1991) (holding that under the survival statute, "the damages are limited to compensation for the pain and suffering by the deceased,
his loss of time and his expenses between the time of the injury and his death
. . . " (quoting Stewart, 104 Md. at 34243, 65 A. at 49»; Biro v. Schorn bert, 41
Md. App. 658, 665, 398 A.2d 519, 523, vacated on other grounds, 285 Md. 290,
402 A.2d 71 (1979) (noting that damages in a survival action are "limited to
compensation for pain and suffering sustained, expenses incurred, and loss of
earnings, by the deceased from the time of the infliction of the injury to the
time of death"). In Jones, the court noted that the Maryland Civil Pattern Jury
Instructions also embody this rule. See Jones, 351 Md. at 126, 716 A.2d at 288
(quoting that economic loss is to be considered "[f]rom the time of injury to
the time of death" (citations omitted».
44. See Streide~ 329 Md. at 544 n.9, 620 A.2d at 911 n.9 (noting that the survival
statute allows for loss of earnings and medical expenses); Fennel~ 320 Md. at
792, 580 A.2d at 214 (observing that damages in a survival action include
"conscious pain and suffering as well as medical expenses, but exclude future
loss of earnings, solatium damages, and damages which result to other persons from the death"); Rhone, 224 Md. at 230, 167 A.2d at 777 (explaining
that damages in a survival action do not include those for the shortening of
the decedent's life); Biro, 41 Md. App. at 665, 398 A.2d at 523 ("Damages in
Survival Statute actions are limited to compensation for pain and suffering
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low the recovery of punitive damages in survival actions. 45 Therefore, under Maryland's survival statute the issue is making the decedent's estate whole, not whether the decedent's relatives are entitled
to any benefit.
III. THE WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE

A.

Wrongful Death Statutes Generally

The purpose underlying wrongful death statutes is to provide
the decedent's relatives with recovery for lost support or benefits
that would have been provided to them had the decedent not died
as a result of another's negligence. 46 Wrongful death statutes can be
traced to England's enactment of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846 in
recognition of the injustice created by the absence of a remedy for
wrongful death. 47 The United States soon followed, with New York
enacting the first wrongful death statute in 1847.48 Currently, all fifty
states have enacted statutes providing a cause of action to remedy
wrongful death. 49 Further, while most jurisdictions have a general

45.

46.
47.

48.
49.

sustained, expenses incurred, and loss of earnings .... "). The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland recently included loss of consortium damages as appropriate compensation for an injury recoverable in a survival action. See
ACandS, 104 Md. App. at 645, 657 A.2d at 397-98 (explaining that loss of consortium damages are recoverable in a survival action and holding that the decedent's death does not terminate the entitlement to damages).
See Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 160, 297 A.2d 721, 727
(1972) (" '[I]f a wrongdoer may be punished if his victim lives, then surely he
should not escape retribution if his wrongful act causes a death.'" (quoting
Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424, 425 (E.D. Iowa 1967), overruled on other
grounds, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992»).
The court in Zenobia moved from a presumed malice to an actual malice standard when punitive damages are at issue. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 459, 601 A.2d
at 652.
See ACandS, 104 Md. App. at 64445, 657 A.2d at 397-98; Stewart, 104 Md. at
33840, 65 A. at 52.
See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY § 1:8
(3d ed. 1992). "Thus, Lord Campbell's Act created a new cause of action
based upon the defendant's wrongful act, neglect or default, limited recovery
to certain beneficiaries, and measured damages with respect to the loss suffered by these beneficiaries." Id.
See id. § 1:9.
See id.; see also ALA. CODE §§ 6-2-38(a),(0), 6-5410, 411, 462 (1993) (maintaining that actions by personal representatives to recover damages for a wrongful
act, omission, or negligence causing the decedent's death, or for damage to
decedent's death is permissible so long as commenced within two years from
death); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.55.570, .580 (Michie 1998) (providing causes of action, other than defamation, to survive to the personal representative of the
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decedent and permitting initiation of a wrongful death action by the estate);
ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 12-542 (two-year limitation), 12-551 (product liability), 12611 (liability), 12-612 (named parties), 12-613 (measure of damages), 14-3110
(causes of action survive) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-62-101, -102 (Michie
1987 & Supp.) (allowing survival of actions except libel and slander to survive
the death of decedent and providing for wrongful death actions to be
brought by the estate); CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE §§ 340, 377.20-.21, .30-.31, .34-.35,
.40-.43, .60-.62 (West 1982) (stating that wrongful death actions must be
brought within one year, actions may survive after a person's death, and may
be brought by the decedent's successor in interest); COL. REv. STAT. §§ 13-20101, 13-21-202, 13-80-102 (1997) (allowing all causes of action, other than libel
or slander, to be brought or continued despite death of a party within two
years after the cause of action accrues); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-555, -599
(1991) (permitting a cause of action to survive the decedent's death); DEL.
CaNST. art. 4, § 23 (allowing actions to survive death of party), DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 3701, 3707, 3722, 3724-35, 8107 (1999) (stating actions survive
and may be initiated after death of a party unless for defamation, malicious
prosecution, or upon penal statutes, and may be maintained against a person
whose wrongful act causes the death of another); D.G CODE ANN. §§ 12-101,
16-2701, 16-2702, 20-741 (1997) (allowing the right to bring a cause of action
to survive the decedent); FLA. STAT. A,"IN. §§ 46.021, 95.11(4)(d), 768.19-.27
(West 1997) (permitting actions to survive the death of a party and for wrongful death actions to be brought within two years); GA CODE ANN. §§ 9-241, 93-33, 514-1, 514-2, 51-4-5 (1982) (stating actions for wrongful death may be
brought by the surviving spouse, child, or personal representative of the decedent for wrongful death within two years); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 663-3 to -8
(1993 & Supp. 1999) (providing the personal representative to bring an action for wrongful death and actions survive death of either party); IDAHO
CODE §§ 5-311, 5-319, 5-327 (Michie 1998) (stating that actions for wrongful
death by or against the estate is permitted and actions survive notwithstanding
death of a party); 740 ILL. CaMP. STAT. 180/2, 5/27-6 (1993) (permitting actions to survive the death of a party); IND. CODE §§ 34-1-2-7, 34-9-3-1 to -5, 3411-7-1, 34-23-1-1 (1998) (allowing actions to survive the death of the decedent
and be brought within 18 months of the date of death and wrongful death actions to be brought); IOWA CODE §§ 611.20-.22, 613.15, 633.336 (1999) (permitting all causes of action to survive the' death of a party and initiation of
wrongful death actions); RAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-513, 60-1801-02, 60-1802, 601901 to -1903 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (stating causes of action survive the death
of a party and actions may be brought for wrongful death); Ky. CaNST. §§ 54,
241 (limiting the legislature from restricting recoveries for death or injury
and allowing recovery for wrongful death); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 395.270,
411.130,411.140,413.140 (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (providing for the recovery of
damages for wrongful death and allowing actions to survive the death of the
injured party); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 2315.1-.2 (West 1997) (permitting actions to survive the death of the injured party for one year as well as wrongful
death actions); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 2-804, 3-817(a) (West 1998) (allowing wrongful death and survival of actions); MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. §§ 3-901 to -904, 6401 (1998) (providing actions to survive despite
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death, as well as wrongful death actions); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 228, §§ 1,
4, ch. 229, §§ 1-2, 6, ch. 230, §§ 1-2, 4 (1998) (allowing wrongful death and
survival of actions); MICH. COMPo LAws §§ 600.2921-.2922, 600.5805 (1987) (permitting survival of actions after the death of a party and wrongful death actions to be initiated); MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (1998 & Supp. 1999) (permitting
actions arising from death by a wrongful act to be maintained); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 11-7-13, 91-7-233, 91-7-235, 91-7-237 (1999) (permitting the personal
representative to bring a wrongful death action and for continuance of actions despite death of a party); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 537.020, 537.080 (1988)
(continuing actions for personal injuries or death despite death of a party
and allowing wrongful death actions); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-323, -501, 502, -513 (1999) (allowing for both survival of actions upon death of a party
and wrongful death claims); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-1402, 25-1405, 25-1410, 251411, 25-1413, 25-1414, 30-809, 30-810 (1995) (permitting continuation of
claims and initiation of wrongful death actions); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 12.100,
41.085, 41.100, 41.130 (1998 & Supp. 1999) (allowing survival of actions despite death of a party and wrongful death action); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
556:7, 556:9 to :15 (1997) (allowing survival of actions despite death of a party
and wrongful death action); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-3 to 4, 2A:31-1 to -6
(West 1998) (permitting actions to survive despite a parties death, as well as
recovery for wrongful death); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-2-1, 41-2-1 to 4 (Michie
1996 & Supp. 1999) (providing recovery for wrongful death and survival of
claims notwithstanding the death of a party); NY CONST. art. I, § 16 (permitting continuation of actions despite death), N.Y C.P.L.R. 210, 214 (McKinney
1990) (permitting actions to survive the death of a party so long as it is within
the three-year statute of limitations), N.Y EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAw §§ 54.1,
11-3.2 (1999) (permitting wrongful death action and survival of action despite
death); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-53, 28A-18-1, 28A-18-2 (1999) (recovering for
wrongful death permitted within two years of the date of death and most actions survive the death of a party); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-01-26.1, 32-21-01 to
-06 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (permitting survival of claims within the statute of
limitations despite death of a party and recovery for wrongful death); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2125.01-.02, 2305.21,2317.421 (Anderson 1994) (allowing
claims for wrongful death and survival of actions); OKlA. STAT. tit. 12 §§ 105155 (1998) (providing for continuation of causes of actions regardless of death
of a party and permitting actions for wrongful death); OR. REv. STAT. §§
30.020, 30.075, 30.080 (1999) (permitting actions to survive death of a party
and recovery for wrongful death); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3373, tit. 42 §§
2202, 8301-02 (West 1998) (allowing for actions to survive the death of a party
and for wrongful death claims); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-1-6 to -8, 10-7-1 to -13
(1997 & Supp. 1999) (permitting actions that survive the death of a party and
compensate for wrongful death); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-51-10, 15-51-20, 15-5140
to 42, 15-51-60 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (allowing recovery for wrongful death and
continuation of action despite death of party); S.D. CODmED LAws §§ 15-4-1,
15-4-2, 15-6-25(a), 21-5-2 to -9 (Michie 1987) (continuing actions regardless of
death of a party and affording compensation for wrongful death); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-5-101 to -113 (1994) (permitting wrongful death actions and survival of actions despite death of a party); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
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wrongful death statute, some jurisdictions also provide statutory
remedies for specific situations. 50
Because of the statutes' diversity, it is nearly impossible to
group them into clearly defined categories. Even statutes originally
enacted in the United States with similar wording have undergone
quite different judicial constructions. 51 However, two broad categories of state wrongful death statutes have emerged. 52 The first category includes those tracking Lord Campbell's Act, creating a new
cause of action for designated persons or for the decedent's personal representative. 53 This type of wrongful death statute attempts
to compensate designated beneficiaries for their loss resulting from
the victim's death. 54
The second category is "'survival-type' wrongful death statutes
[that] simply continue the cause of action for tortious injury that
the decedent would have possessed, but for death. "55 Again, this survival-type statute varies regarding who may initiate the action,56 but
the intent is to compensate the loss to the decedent's estate. 57

50.

51.
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

§§ 71.001-.0011, 71.021 (Vernon 1997) (allowing actions to survive death of a
party and recovery for wrongful death); UTAH CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (prohibiting abrogation of an action because of death of a party), UTAH CODE ANN. §§
78-11-7, -12 (1996) (allowing for recovery of wrongful death of an adult and
survival of action); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1452-53, 1491-92 (1989) (permitting recovery for wrongful death and continuation of action regardless of
death of party); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-25, 8.01-50 to -64 (Michie 1998) (providing for continuation of an action regardless of death of a party and for
wrongful death recovery); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.20.005, .010, .020, .046, .050,
.060 (1988) (recovering for wrongful death and survival of action despite
death of a party permitted); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-2-18, 55-7-5 to -8a, 56-8-1 to -2
(1997 & Supp. 1999) (providing survival of action and assertion of wrongful
death claims); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 777.01, 893.22, 893.54, 895.Q1 (West 1997)
(permitting recovery for wrongful death and continuation of actions despite
death of a party).
See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 47, §§ 1:14-1:17 (discussing specific state idiosyncracies in addition to more common specialized statutes for worker's compensation, dram shop recovery, and uninsured motorist protection).
See id. § 15:8.
See C. Frederick Overby & Jason Crawford, The Case for Allowing Punitive Damages in Georgia Wrongful Death Actions: The Need to Remove an Unjust Anomaly in
Georgia Law, 45 MERCER L. REv. 1,9 (1993).
See id.
See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 47, § 1:9.
Overby & Crawford, supra note 52, at 9.
See id. at 9 (allowing an action in the name of the estate or an action by designated persons such as the surviving spouse or children).
See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 47, § 1:9.
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Maryland s Wrongful Death Statute

Maryland's wrongful death statute allows particular relatives 58 of
a victim who died as a result of a tortfeasor's conduct to bring a
cause of action for injuries to them as a result of the death. 59 As
such, it follows the first broad category of wrongful death statutes. 60
The damages recoverable under a wrongful death claim include pecuniary losses to the claimant as a result of the decedent's death,
such as medical and funeral expenses, emotional pain and suffering, and loss of support, as well as non-pecuniary damages. 61
C.

Future Lost Earnings

1.

Generally

Under both wrongful death and survival action statutes, a person should be able to recover future lost earnings. Future lost earn58. Maryland's wrongful death statute provides which relatives may bring a wrongful death action and separates this into primary and secondary beneficiaries.
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 3-904 (1998) ("Action for wrongful
death"). First, primary beneficiaries, defined as a wife, husband, parent, or a
child of the deceased person, may bring a wrongful death action. See id. If no
one qualifies as a primary beneficiary, then a secondary beneficiary may bring
the action. A secondary beneficiary is defined as "any person related to the
deceased person by blood or marriage who was substantially dependent upon
the deceased." Id. § 3-904(b).
59. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 3-904 (1998) (delineating which relatives may bring a wrongful death action and laying out the damages that may
be recovered). Maryland's wrongful death statute is essentially an adoption of
a statute from England historically known as the Lord Campbell's Act. See
Stewart V. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 334, 65 A.49, 50
(1906) (tracing the history of the adoption of Maryland's wrongful death statute). Maryland adopted Lord Campbell's Act under the Act of 1852, chapter
299. See id.
60. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
61. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 3-903 (1998). The statute expressly
states that the damages recoverable "may include damages for mental
anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, marital care, paternal care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education . . . . " [d. § 3-904(d). See, e.g., Carolina
Freight Carriers Corp. V. Keane, 311 Md. 335, 336-37, 534 A.2d 1337, 1338
(1988) (awarding solatium damages, damages allowed for the injury to the
feelings, to parents for the loss of their child); Ory V. Libersky, 40 Md. App.
151, 156, 166-67, 389 A.2d 922, 926, 931 (1978) (affirming a trial judge's instruction that allowed the jury to consider whether children would be entitled
to damages, such as, the cost of higher education, mental anguish, emotional
pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, and guidance due to the
loss of their father).
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ings are defined as "[t]he amount of money the decedent would
have earned had he lived out his normal life expectancy. "62 Calculation of future lost earnings is not exact; it requires some speculation about the decedent's life expectancy and potential work experience. 63 Although somewhat predictable when the individual
works,64 the subjectivity is enhanced when the individual has never
worked or is currently unemployed. 65

2.

Maryland

Damages for future lost earnings are recoverable in a personal
injury action as provided for under section 11-109 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article. 66 A future lost earnings award is allowed for those amounts reasonably certain to result from the injury.67 For judicial simplicity, the award is usually allocated in a
lump sum. 68 The amount awarded must be based upon present
value and not upon speculation about inflation or other unknown
factors impacting earning potential. 69
62. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 47, § 3:50.
63. See id.
64. See generally Michael T. Brody, Inflation, Productivity, and the Total Offset Method
of Calculating Damages for Lost Future Earnings, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1003 (1982)
(referring to consideration of factors such as "age, occupation, education, and
actuarial probability of survival" for predicting future wages).
65. Maryland allows recovery for lost future wages for a minor child. See Johns
Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 689, 697 A.2d 1358, 1363 (1997) (deciding upon the extent of damages sustained by an infant who underwent
open heart surgery at the age of four months). The exhaustive exploration of
various factors to consider in calculating lost future earnings is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
66. See MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-109 (1998). The statute addressing
the damages allowed includes the following:
a. (1) In this section, "economic damages" means loss of earnings
and medical expenses. (2)"Economic damages" does not include punitive damages. b. As part of the verdict in any action for damages
for personal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after
July 1, 1986 or for wrongful death in whidl the cause of action arises
on or after October 1, 1994, the trier of tact shall itemize the award
to reflect the monetary amount intended for: (1) Past medical expenses; (2) Future medical expenses; (3) Past loss of earnings; (4)
Future loss of earnings; (5) Noneconomic damages; and (6) Other
damages.
[d. (emphasis added).
67. See Brooks v. Fairman, 253 Md. 471, 252 A.2d 865 (1969).
68. See Scott v. James Gibbons Co., 192 Md. 319, 331 A.2d 117 (1949).
69. See Baublitz v. Henz, 73 Md. App. 538, 550-51, 535 A.2d 497, 501 (1988) (rea-
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IV. COMPARISON OF MARYLAND'S SURVIVAL AND WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES
While both Maryland's survival statute and wrongful death statute provide damages to individuals as a result of a single tortious
act, each have separate purposes, separate causes of action, and separate treatments of damages. These differences are crucial to understanding how Maryland's case law has gone so far afield of what the
statutes were designed to compensate for.

A.

Separate Purposes

The wrongful death statute and the survival statute were enacted for distinct purposes. The actions are by different persons,
"the damages go into different channels and are recovered upon
different grounds, and the causes of action, though growing out of
the same wrongful act or neglect, are entirely distinct. "70 The purpose of the wrongful death statute is to provide the decedent's relatives with an award for the lost support that they would have received had the decedent not died as a result of a tortfeasor's
negligence. 71 Whereas, the purpose of the survival statute is to provide for the recovery of damages, sustained by the decedent in life,
which the decedent could have recovered had he survived.72

B.

Separate Causes of Action Under Each Claim·

A wrongful death action and a survival action, though growing
out of the same wrongful or negligent act, are two distinct causes of
action.1 3 An action for wrongful death is a cause of action, created
by statute, that can be brought by relatives of the decedent,74 while
a survival action is an existing cause of action that survives the decedent and can be pursued by the personal representative on the decedent's behalf. 75
C.

Separate Treatment of Damages Under Each Statute

In Maryland, courts maintain a clear distinction between a survival action and a wrongful death action to ensure there exists no
soning that the court of appeals would agree with this conclusion).
70. Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 339, 65 A. 49, 52
(1906).
71. See id. at 338-40, 65 A. at 52.
72. See supra note 40.
73. See Stewart, 104 Md. at 340, 65 A. at 52.
74. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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overlap of damages. 76 Therefore, the damages awarded under each
action shall be considered separately, and any discussion of damages under the survival statute may not include those damages recoverable under the wrongful death statute. 77
When an individual injured by the negligence of another dies
prior to bringing a personal injury action, all claims brought under
the survival statute, including claims for personal injuries, survive
that individual's death. 78 A survival action may also be initiated by
the decendent's personal representative on behalf of the estate after
the decendent's death as if the decedent survived.19 However, if the
injured victim survived and lived throughout the pendency of the
suit, the victim could receive future lost earnings as part of a damage award. 80 According to the current practice of Maryland courts,
76. See Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 76 Md. App. 524, 538, 547 A.2d 654, 660

77.

78.
79.

80.

(1988). The Globe court noted that Maryland has been pointed to "as a jurisdiction that meticulously distinguishes the damages in a survival action from
the damages in a wrongful death action, thereby avoiding the problem of duplication in the element of damages." Id. (citing Bowen E. Schumacher, Rights
of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 MICH. L. REv. 114, 126 (1924»;
Stewart, 104 Md. at 339-40, 65 A.2d at 52 ("Under the [wrongful death statute]
the damages recoverable are such as the equitable plaintiffs have sustained by
the death of the party injured. Under [the survival statute] the damages recoverable are only such as the deceased sustained in his lifetime, and consequently exclude those which result to other persons from his death. Under
the [wrongful death statute] the damages are apportioned by the jury among
the equitable plaintiffs, and belong exclusively to them, and form no part of
the assets of the decedent's estate. Under the [survival statute] the damages
recovered go in to the hands of the executor or administrator and constitute
assets of the estate. The cause of action is created by [the death], and is a
new cause of action, and consequently one which the deceased never had.
Under the [survival statute] there is a survival of a cause of action which the
decedent had in his lifetime.").
See Stewart, 104 Md. at 340-41, 65 A. at 53. The court in Stewart further points
out that even though the causes of action flow from the same cause, the same
act may injure different individuals in different ways and each of those individuals should have separate remedies for the recovery of damages sustained
by them. See id. at 340, 65 A. at 52.
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-401 (1998) (enumerating when actions survive at law and in equity).
See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7-401 (y) (Supp. 1999) ("He may prosecute, defend, or submit to arbitration actions, claims, or proceedings in any
appropriate jurisdiction for the protection or benefit of the estate, including
the commencement of a personal action which the decedent might have commenced or prosecuted .... ").
See Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 274, 280-81, 623 A.2d 656, 659 (1993) (stating
that, in a personal injury action, a plaintiff may recover damages "for loss of
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however, the decedent's estate may not recover future lost earnings
in a survival action. 8 !
V.

MARYLAND COURTS' VIEW OF FUTURE LOST EARNINGS

Various court decisions in Maryland led to the recent holding
by the court of appeals in Jones v. Flood. 82 In Jones, the court held
that future lost earnings are not recoverable by a decedent's estate
in a survival action for personal injuries. 83 One such case leading to
the conclusion in Jones is Stewart v. United Electric Light & Power Co. 84
In Stewart, the court of appeals laid the foundation upon which all
other cases rely with regard to recovery under the survival statute. 85

A. The State of the Law Beginning With Stewart v. United Electric
Light & Power Company
The court in Stewart decided whether both a wrongful death action and a survival action may be pursued concurrently when each
flows from the same wrongful act. 86 Stewart involved an action by an
estate administrator to recover damages due to the defendant's negligence. 87 The decedent, a professional tinner and roofer, received
an electric shock when he came into contact with charged wires
while working for the defendants. 88 He was thrown to the ground,
seriously injured, and suffered for a number of hours before eventually dying. 89 The single question before the Maryland Court of Appeals was whether the cause of action, which accrued in the decedent's lifetime from the alleged negligence of the defendants,
abated when he died or survived enabling his administrator to

81.

82.
83.
84.
85.

86.
87.
88.
89.

future earnings which will reasonably and probably result from the tort"); see
also Adams v. Benson, 208 Md. 261, 270-71, 117 A.2d 881, 885 (1955) (holding
that plaintiff may recover for any damages which certainly or reasonably resulted as a proximate consequence from the tort).
See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text; see also Monias, 330 Md. at 279 &
n.2, 623 A.2d at 658 & n.2 (stating that lost future earnings are not recoverable in a survival action in Maryland).
351 Md. 120, 716 A.2d 285 (1998).
See id. at 131, 716 A.2d at 290.
104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49 (1906).
See id. at 339, 65 A. at 52 (holding that, under the abatement and wrongful
death statutes, there are two separate and distinct causes of action arising out
of the same wrongful act).
See id. at 340, 65 A. at 52.
See id. at 333, 65 A. at 49.
See id. at 333, 65 A. at 49-50.
See id. at 333, 65 A. at 50.
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maintain a suit. 90
The court thoroughly discussed both the wrongful death statute
and the survival statute,91 clarifYing the scope of the survival statute
and the damages recoverable under it.92 It explained that the estate
may recover only those damages that the decedent could have recovered had he survived and instituted the action himself,93 and
limited the recovery in a survival action to losses sustained between
the decedent's time of injury and the time of death. 94 The court
created this limitation in order to prevent an overlap of damages
with those recoverable under the wrongful death statute. 95 With this
decision, the Stewart court created a common-law rule that contradicted the legislative intent of the survival statute and the personal
representative statute. 96 Unfortunately, this remains the rule of law
in Maryland and has been relied upon in subsequent decisions
prohibiting the recovery of future lost earnings.

B.

Stewart s Progeny

Since Stewart, Maryland courts apply its rule to determine the
recoverability of certain damages in a survival action for personal injuries. 97 In fact, the court of special appeals, in Biro v. Schombert,98
looked to Stewart when asked to decide whether future lost earnings
were recoverable in a survival action.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 333-43, 65 A. at 50-53 (discussing the law in Maryland as it was settled
in 1852 and its roots in English common law).
92. See id. at 342-43, 65 A. at 53 (stating that determination of damages requires
close observance of the nature of the statute under which the action is
brought).
93. See id.
94. See id. (identifying as compensable the deceased's pain and suffering, loss of
time, and expenses between the time of injury and death).
95. See id. at 344, 65 A. at 54 (stating that to prevent defendants from being exposed to a danger of injustice, meaning double recovery, the damages under
the survival statute must be limited to those sustained between the time of injury and the time of death).
96. See supra Part VI.A for a discussion of how Stewart contradicts the plain and
clear language of the two statutes.
97. See, e.g., Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 126, 716 A.2d 285, 288 (1998) (acknowledging that under the survival statute, damages are limited to compensation
for pain and suffering, loss of time, and expenses between the time of injury
and death (quoting Stewart, 104 Md. at 343, 65 A. at 53»; ACandS, Inc. v.
Asner, 104 Md. App. 608, 645, 657 A.2d 379, 397 (1995).
98. 41 Md. App. 658, 398 A.2d 519 (1979), vacated on other grounds, 285 Md. 290,
402 A.2d 71 (1979).
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Biro v. Schombert

In Biro, the parents and personal representatives of a twenty
year old boy killed in a head-on collision brought suit against the
driver of the other automobile for both wrongful death and survival
actions. 99 The trial court granted partial summary judgment as to
the future damages claim, limiting recovery to $2000 for funeral
expenses. 100
The single issue raised on appeal was whether the personal representative of the decedent's estate could recover for future lost
earnings in a survival action brought by the personal representative. 101 The court made it clear that the limitation imposed by Stewart was proper and dispositive of the issue. 102 Thus, the court held
future lost earnings are not recoverable in a survival action because
they do not accrue before the time of death. 103
In addition, the Biro court, in dicta, addressed the argument
raised by the appellant that it is unjust to disallow recovery by a decedent's estate for future lost earnings when the person is killed by
another's negligent conduct. I04 The appellants unsuccessfully argued
that, under current Maryland law, a tortfeasor who kills another
person is liable for a smaller amount of damages than if the
tortfeasor were only to injure that person. !Os
The court gave two reasons why the appellant's claim was invalid. 106 First, the appellants, parents of the deceased, and others in
their position, are not without a remedy.107 The court illustrated
that the Maryland legislature, in passing the wrongful death statute,
99. See id. at 659, 398 A.2d at 520.
100. See id. at 660, 398 A.2d at 520.

101. See id. at 660, 398 A.2d at 52!.
102. See id. at 665-66, 398 A.2d at 524 (stating that there is no valid claim for loss of
future earnings because the clear message of Stewart is that an estate may only
recover losses sustained between time of injury and death).
103. See id. at 666, 398 A.2d at 524 (reasoning that there can be no valid claim by
the estate for the loss of future earnings if the claim ceases to accrue as of
the time of death).
104. See id. (noting that the parents of the deceased are not without remedy and
that the Legislature has had numerous opportunities to change the law if the
Stewart decision was inconsistent with legislative intent).
105. This is because someone who is only injured may bring an action for personal
injury themselves and recover loss of future earnings. See id. (noting the appellant's suggestion that under existing law, "it is cheaper to kill than to injure").
106. See id.
107. See id.
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gave certain persons the right to maintain a suit for the loss suffered as a result of the wrongful death of another.108
Second, the Biro court stated that, since the Maryland Legislature had not overturned the Stewart decision by statutory enactment,
the Legislature must have intended exactly what the Stewart court
held. 109 However, it was not until the court's decision in Biro that
the effects of this limitation on recovery surfaced and led to unjust
results. Before Biro, there was no reason for the Legislature to modify the holding in Stewart with a statutory enactment. Interestingly,
the Biro holding was short-lived; the court of appeals vacated it because the court of special appeals had no authority to hear the appeal on its merits. IIO
2.

Jones v. Flood

It was not until 1997 in Jones v. Flood,111 that an appellate court
in Maryland again addressed whether a personal representative may
recover future lost earnings in a survival action brought on behalf
of the deceased for personal injuries caused by the wrongful act of
another.1I2 For many of the same reasons given by the court in Biro,
the Jones court rejected the personal representative's claims.1I3
In Jones, the personal representative of a motorist killed in a
collision with a county vehicle brought a survival action. 114 The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the
ground that the plaintiff could not recover damages for future lost
earnings and awarded funeral and medical expenses only. 115
108. See id. (explaining that the common-law concept of no recovery by anyone except the injured party was wisely remedied by the Legislature which provided
in the statute that the wife, husband, parent, or child can maintain a wrongful death suit).
109. See Biro, 41 Md. App. at 666-67, 398 A.2d at 524 (stating that because the Legislature has not changed the Stewart decision through further statutory enactments, one can only conclude that the Legislature meant what the Stewart
court said it meant).
110. See Biro v. Schombert, 285 Md. 290, 297, 402 A.2d 71, 75 (1979) (holding that
the circuit court had no authority to make its decision final and appealable).
Where the appellate court had no authority to hear the appeal on its merits,
it is improper to rely upon the opinion therein and assert the opinion as support for the issue raised therein. See Eastgate Assocs. v. Apper, 276 Md. 698,
704,350 A.2d 661, 665 (1976).
111. 118 Md. App. 217, 702 A.2d 440 (1997).
112. See id. at 220, 702 A.2d at 441.
113. See supra notes 101'{)9 and accompanying text.
114. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 122, 716 A.2d 285, 286 (1998).
115. See Jones, 118 Md. App. at 219, 702 A.2d at 441.
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The decision by the court of special appeals, upholding summary judgment, was erroneous for two reasons. First, the court relied on its holding in Biro that future lost earnings are not recoverable by a personal representative in a survival action. 116 It was
improper for the court of special appeals to do so because the decision was vacated by the court of appeals. 1I7 Second, the court also
relied upon Stewart's interpretation of the scope of recovery under
the survival statute,1I8 erroneously concluding that because future
lost earnings are recoverable under the wrongful death statute,
those damages are not recoverable in a survival action. 1I9
One year later, the Court of Appeals of Maryland heard this
case as one of first impression. 12o The court, relying heavily on the
legal conclusions in Stewart,121 held that future lost earnings are not
recoverable in a survival action. 122
The court of appeals repeated the doctrine created by the Stewart court, that the survival statute limits the recovery of damages to
only those sustained between the time of injury and the time of
death. 123 The court used this judicially-created doctrine to exclude
recovery of any future lost earnings. 124
Additionally, the Jones court adopted the notion that the estate
of a person tortiously killed is not, and never has been, a beneficiary of damages for wrongful death.125 Therefore, the court reasoned
that a personal representative's claim for future lost earnings is an
116. See id. at 221, 702 A.2d at 442.
117. See supra note 110.
118. See Jones, 118 Md. App. at 221, 702 A.2d at 442 (limiting damages under the
statute to pain and suffering, loss of time, and expenses between the time of
injury and death).
119. See id. at 224, 702 A.2d at 443 ("Because damages for future loss of earnings
. . . may be recovered in a wrongful death action as the pecuniary value of
the life of the decedent, those damages are not recoverable in a survival action.").
120. SeeJones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120,716 A.2d 285 (1998).
121. See id. at 126, 716 A.2d at 288 (noting that Maryland courts have consistently
applied the survival statute in accordance with the Stewart construction, that
is, that it applies to pre-death harms only).
122. See id. at 131, 716 A.2d at 290 (concluding that "[iJf . . . the injured person is
killed instantly, there are no future lost earnings damages in the survival action").
123. See id. (citing Stewart as support for proposition that damages are limited to
pain and suffering, and loss of time and expenses between the time of injury
and death).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 128, 716 A.2d at 289.
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"end run around"126 the limitation imposed by the wrongful death
act, whereby only a certain class of individuals may benefit from an
award of wrongful death damages-an element of which is future
lost earnings. 127 The court emphasized that if a claim for future lost
earnings was to survive, no limitation on the class of potential beneficiaries would exist. 128
Further, the court held that allowing an estate to recover future
lost earnings in a survival action would yield a double recovery.129
This was based on the premise that the award would not be an accurate assessment of the amount the estate would have been enriched by the future earnings. 130 The court reasoned that an award
to the estate for future lost earnings would not take into account
the amount of money the decedent would have spent on the decedent's own personal expenses and for the support of others.131
Finally, the Jones court erroneously concluded that since future
lost earnings are recoverable under the wrongful death statute,
those damages are not recoverable in a survival action.132 Unfortunately, the Jones court fell into the very trap warned of earlier, that
the wrongful death statute and the survival statute provide for two
separate causes of action. 133 Because the losses recovered under
each are distinct, damages recovered under one statute cannot preclude recovery under the other. 134

126. See id.
127. See id. at 128-29, 716 A.2d at 289.
128. See id. at 129, 716 A.2d at 289 (stating that the class of persons who may sue

129.

130.
131.
132.

133.

134.

for post-death earnings would extend far beyond the relationships specified in
the wrongful death statute).
See id. (stating that allowing recovery for future lost earnings would duplicate
the damages awarded in a wrongful death action).
See id. at 129-30, 716 A.2d at 289-90.
See id.
See Jones, 118 Md. App. at 224, 702 A.2d at 443 ("Because damages for future
"loss of earnings . . . may be recovered in a wrongful death action measured as
the pecuniary value of the life of the decedent, those damages are not recoverable in a survival action.").
See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 342, 65 A. 49, 50
(1906).
See supra Part VI for a discussion of the distinction between wrongful death
damages and survival damages; recovery under one does not preclude recovery under the other.
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VI. MARYLAND SHOULD PERMIT DAMAGES FOR FUTURE
LOST EARNINGS IN A SURVIVAL ACTION
Several reasons exist why Maryland should permit recovery of
future lost earnings in survival actions. Primarily, given the plain
and clear language of the statute, Maryland courts cannot disregard
the cardinal rule of statutory construction which provides that if the
language of a statute is unambiguous, it must be followed. In addition r the legislative intent is clear that future lost earnings are to be
included in damages recoverable under Maryland's survival statute.
As support for these propositions, other jurisdictions adhere to
these principles with similarly worded survival statutes. Finally, public policy demands that to avoid UI~ust results, survival action
awards must include future lost earnings.
A.

The Plain and Clear Language of the Statutes Should be Followed

Regarding the courts' limitation on recoverable damages and
on actions surviving the decedent's death, it must be noted that it is
beyond the courts' judicial power to "disregard the natural import
of words with a view toward making the statute express an intention
which is different from its plain meaning."135 However, beginning
with Stewart v. United Electric Light & Power CO.,136 and ending with
the recent decision in Jones v. Flood, I37 Maryland courts have not adhered to this cardinal rule of statutory construction. 138 Instead, they
have limited the types of damages recoverable in a survival action
and effectively limited the causes of action that survive the death of
the injured party.139 This refusal to adhere to canons of statutory
construction results from the courts' effort to prevent duplicating
damages. l40 However, neither the Stewart court, nor any subsequent
135. Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust, 273 Md. 58, 66, 327 A.2d 483, 487
(1974).
136. 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49 (1906).
137. 351 Md. 120, 716 A.2d 285 (1998).
138. See supra Part VA-C.
139. See generally Jones, 351 Md. at 125, 716 A.2d at 287 (holding that an estate may
not recover damages for future lost earnings in a survival action); Stewart, 104
Md. at 343, 65 A. at 53 (holding that the damages recoverable in a survival action are limited to only those losses sustained between the time of injury and
the time of death).
140. See Jones, 351 Md. at 129, 716 A.2d at 289 (reasoning that if loss of future earnings were recoverable in a survival action, and were also recoverable in a
wrongful death action, then a person may recover the same damages under
two separate causes of action leading to a duplication of damages).
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Maryland court, provide any rationale to support that such a policy
was the intent of the Legislature. In the absence of such support,
the plain and clear language of the statutes should not be
ignored. 141
Looking to the plain and clear language, the statute expressly
provides that the estate may recover "funeral expenses . . . in addi~
tion to other damages recoverable in the action . . . ." 142 Thus it is
clear that the Legislature intended for all damages to be recover~
able in a survival action commenced by the personal representative.
From this reading, it follows that damages for future lost earnings
were intended to be included in a survival action brought for personal injury.143
The current interpretation given to the survival statute by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland contradicts the plain and clear language of the wrongful death and survival statutes, resulting in un~
just results. l44 The survival statute expressly grants personal representatives the right to recover all damages "recoverable in the
action."145 There are no words of limitation in the statute. l46
Because the plain and clear language of both statutes allows for
survival of all actions and recovery of all damages, a limitation on
the damages recoverable is contrary to what the Legislature intended. 147 Therefore, just as the Stewart court was incorrect fIfty~fIve
years ago in creating this limitation, it is equally wrong for the Jones
court to uphold it.
supra note 66 and accompanying text.
142. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7401 (y) (Supp. 1999).
143. See, e.g., Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 274, 281, 623 A.2d 656, 659 (1993) (stating
that loss of future earnings are recoverable in an action for personal injuries).
See generaUy Burke v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 981, 998 (D. Md. 1985) (discussing the computation of lost earnings in a personal injury case); Anderson
v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 572, 694 A.2d 150, 161 (1997) ("Essentially,
an accident victim is entitled to be compensated to the extent his or her
power to work . . . has been reduced by the injury.").
144. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (holding by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland that lost earnings are not recoverable in a survival action in Jones);
Part II.B (discussing Maryland's survival statute) and Part I1I.B (discussing Maryland's wrongful death statute).
145. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7401(y) (Supp. 1999).
146. See id.
147. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6401 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 7401(y) (Supp. 1999); see also Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 273 Md. 58, 65-66, 327 A.2d 483, 487 (1974) (stating that legislative
intent is ascertained by looking at the plain and clear language of the statute).
141. See
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Legislative Intent

"The cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain
and carry out the legislative intent. "148 The primary source for determining legislative intent is the statute's language. 149 Furthermore,
where the language is clear and free from ambiguity, there is generally no need to look beyond the statute to determine the Legislature's intent. 150
The language used in the personal representative statute is
clear and unambiguous, 151 and should therefore be used to determine the Legislature's intent regarding any limitation on this statute. 152 The language of the statute provides that, with the exception
of slander, "a cause of action at law . . . survives the death of either
party." 153 The Legislature clearly intended for all causes of action to
survive. It logically follows that a personal injury action, brought to
recover damages for future lost earnings, is included in the causes
of action that survive.
Although the first survival statute appeared in 1795, at the time
of the wrongful death statute's adoption in 1852, the ability to commence a survival action when death resulted from a tortious injury
did not exist. By enacting the wrongful death statute, Maryland legislators sought to afford designated persons relief for injuries they
148. Purifoy, 273 Md. at 65, 327 A,2d at 487 (citing Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 306 A,2d 534 (1973»; accord Board of Trustees v. Kielczewski,

149.
150.

151.
152.

153.

77 Md. App. 581, 587, 551 A.2d 485, 488 (1989) ("In determining that intent,
the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary
signification."). See generally State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 423-24, 348 A.2d
275, 278, 280 (1975) (determining that the Legislature clearly intended the
term "cause" in child abuse cases to include injuries resulting from cruel and
inhumane treatment); Scoville Scm, 269 Md. at 393, 396, 306 A,2d at 537-38
(holding that the Legislature did not intend for the common-place meaning
of the word "admissions" to include parking fees).
See, e.g., Kielczewski, 77 Md. App. at 587, 551 A,2d at 488.
See id. at 587, 551 A,2d at 488 ("[I]f there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the
language of the statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly."). See generally Maryland Med. Serv.,
Inc. v. Carter, 238 Md. 466, 478, 209 A.2d 582, 588-89 (1965) (finding that a
statute regarding reimbursement of subscribers for medical services was unambiguous on its face, there was no need to look elsewhere).
See infra note 153; see also supra Part II.B.
See Board of License Comm. v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 124, 729 A.2d 407, 411
(1999) ("[W]hen 'there is a lack of relevant legislative history, we must rely
substantially on the language of the statutes in the context of the goals and
objectives they seek to achieve.''').
See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 6401 (a) (1999).
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suffered due to a tortfeasor's actions. Thirty-six years later, these legislators again sought to expand the relief afforded to a tortfeasor's
victims by deleting the restriction abating tort actions upon death. 154
Since this expansion occurred after the enactment of the
wrongful death statute, had the Legislature intended to eliminate
the possibility of double recovery, they could have expressly distinguished the damages allowed under a survival action from those allowed in a wrongful death action. 155 The fact that no limiting language exists is significant, especially because the statutory language
explaining non-economic damages in personal injury actions specifically references the wrongful death statute and expressly differentiates wrongful death action damages. 156
In addition to the legislative intent expressed in the plain and
clear language of Maryland's survival statute, the only explicit limitation provided is that actions for slander do not survive. 157 If the Legislature intended to further restrict the actions that survive, to exclude those for future lost earnings, it would have done this when
the statute was adopted or last revised. 15s The Legislature has not
154. See supra Part II.B.1; see also Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. l38, 151, 571 A.2d 1219,
1225 (1990) (Eldridge, j., dissenting) (noting that "[b]y the late nineteenth
century, the exclusion for tortious injuries had been eliminated, giving executors and administrators full power to commence suits for the recovery of damages for injuries suffered by the testator or intestate in his lifetime").
155. See supra Part II.B.1.
156. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (a) providing:
In this section ... (2) (i) "Noneconomic damages" means: 1. In an
action for personal injury, pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other nonpecuniary injury; and 2. In an action for wrongful death, mental anguish,
emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, care, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education, or other
noneconomic damages authorized under Title 3, Subtitle 9 of this article. (ii) "Noneconomic damages" does not include punitive damages. (3) "Primary claimant" means a claimant in an action for the
death of person described under § 3-904(d) of this article.
[d.
157. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 6401 (b) (1998).
158. This is also a classic statutory construction argument known as expressio unius
est exclusio alterious. See Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 666 & n.l, 684 A.2d 445,
447 & n.l (1996) ('''[T]he expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.'''(quoting BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990»). By expressly
listing slander as a cause of action not covered by the statute, many courts
would conclude that the Maryland General Assembly intended the statute to
include all other causes of action. See id.; see also BFP v. Resolution Trust
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done SO.159
As noted earlier, neither the survival statute nor the personal
representative statute limit the types of damages recoverable in a
personal injury action brought under the survival statute. 160 The
Stewart court correcdy held that the estate may recover those damages that the decedent could have recovered, had the decedent survived. 161 This holding comports with the intent of the Legislature,
given the clear and plain language of both statutes. 162 The Stewart
court was not correct, however, in limiting those damages because
the statute did not expressly provide for such a limitation. 163 The
ability to create such a limitation rests solely with the Legislature
and should be left alone by the courts. l64 It is incorrect for the
court to do so to further a policy which prevents the overlap of
damages, when such a policy is not the intent of the Legislature. 165
The court of appeals has stated that "where the language of the

159.

160.
161.

162.

163.

164.

165.

Corp., 511 U.S. 531,537 (1994); United States v. Espinoza-Leon, 873 F.2d 743,
746 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989).
Compare MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 6401 (b) (1998), with MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 6-401(b) (Supp. 2000), wherein no changes have
been made to the statute's language.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 342-43, 65 A, 49,
53 (1906) (noting that the damages recoverable under each statute are "entirely different").
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 6401 (a) (Supp. 1998) (stating that a
cause of action survives the death of either party whether real, personal, or
mixed); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7-401 (y) (Supp. 1999) (stating that a
personal representative may commence a claim for personal injuries under
the survival statute and may recover all damages recoverable in the action);
see also discussion supra Part IV.A,
See Employment Sec. Admin. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 292 Md. 515, 526, 438
A.2d 1356, 1363 (1982) (stating that "courts will not, under the guise of statutory construction, supply omissions or remedy possible defects in a statute, or
insert exceptions not made by the legislature"); Collier v. Connolly, 285 Md.
123, 128, 400 A,2d 1107, 1109 (1979) (stating that it is not proper for the
courts in construing statutes to supply omissions or remedy defects in statutes,
or to insert provisions not made by the legislature).
See Consolidated Eng'g Co. v. Cooper, 246 Md. 610, 615, 228 A,2d 823, 825
(1967) (declaring that the courts may interpret and construe laws, but only
the legislature has the power to amend them).
See Purifoy V. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 273 Md. 58, 66, 327 A,2d
483, 487 (1974) (stating that it is beyond the courts' liberty to disregard the
natural import of the clear and unambiguous words of a statute with a view
towards making the statute express an intention different from its plain meaning).
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statute is clear and explicit, . . . the court cannot disregard the
mandate of the Legislature and insert an exception, where none
has been made by the Legislature, for the sake of relieving against
hardship or injustice."I66
Furthermore, the losses sought under each statute are completely different. 167 Recovery of future lost earnings under the survival statute compensates the estate for a separate loss than for lost
earnings under the wrongful death statute. 168 Therefore, it is not
true, as the Jones court stated, that allowing such recovery would
eliminate the line drawn by the Legislature under the wrongful
death statute. 169 The line would still remain for limiting those who
could recover damages under the wrongful death statute for the
loss suffered due to the tort victim's death.I7O The Legislature never
intended to limit the recovery of damages under the survival statute
for the loss suffered by the tort victim, so limiting an estate from recovery would undermine the Legislature's intent. By limiting the
survival statute, Maryland courts violated this doctrine of statutory
construction.
C. Other Jurisdictions Have Followed Similar Interpretations of the Survival Statutes

The interpretation of the survival statute, as including damages
for future lost earnings, has been adopted by courts in the District
of Columbia 171 and in the State of Washington. 172 Interpreting a survival statute 173 similar in language to Maryland's, District of Colum166. Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 375, 46 A.2d 619, 621 (1946) (noting that
where there is ambiguity in the statute or the intention of the Legislature is
doubtful, the court may look to the consequences but a judge does not have
the power to mold the statute in accordance with his notions of justice).
167. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 34344, 65 A. 49,
54 (1906).
168. See id. at 343, 65 A. at 53 (stating that recovery under the survival statute is
limited to compensation for pain and suffering and loss of time and expenses
whereas recovery under the wrongful death statute is measured by the value
of life of the party entitled to damages).
169. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 129,716 A.2d 285, 289 (1998) (stating that if
loss of future earnings damages were permitted, the class of persons who may
sue for post-death earnings would extend far beyond the relationships specified in the wrongful death statute).
170. See MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904 (1998).
171. See Runyon v. District of Columbia, 463 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
172. See Criscuola v. Andrews, 507 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1973).
173. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-101 (Supp. 1999). The statute provides, "[o]n the
death of a person in whose favor or against whom a right of action has ac-
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bia courts hold that the purpose of the survival statute is to place
the decedent's estate in the same position it would have enjoyed
had the decedent's life not been prematurely terminated. 174 The
District of Columbia Circuit also holds that a proper recovery under
the statute includes future lost earnings. 175
In further support of including future lost earnings under the
Maryland survival statute, the Supreme Court of Washington, interpreting a survival statute similar to Maryland's, held that allowing
prospective earnings is consistent with the rule that "all" personal
injury causes of action survive. 176 The court recognized that some jurisdictions have limited recovery in survival statutes to losses incurred before death, in an effort to avoid double recovery where an
action for wrongful death is also brought. 177 The court found that,
while limiting such damages is one way to provide for damages
under the survival statute to prevent double recovery, it is "an inappropriate procedure."178 The court reasoned that limiting recovery
in a survival action to the net accumulations of the deceased obviates the problem of double recovery where a wrongful death action
is also brought. 179

D.

Unjust Results Exist Under Current Maryland Law

When a tortfeasor is liable for causing injuries or losses to another, the tortfeasor must be responsible for compensating the victim for such injuries or losses.1 8o Thus, if a tortfeasor causes another
to lose all future earnings, that tortfeasor is liable for compensating

174.

175.

176.
177.

178.
179.
180.

crued for any cause prior to his death, the right of action, for all such cases,
survives in favor of or against the legal representative of the deceased.» Id.
See, e.g., Graves v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 95,99 (D.D.C. 1981) ("Recovery
under the Survival Statute is comprised of that which the deceased would
have been able to recover had he lived." (citing Semler v. Psychiatric lnst. of
Washington, D.C., Inc., 575 F.2d 922, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1978»).
See Runyon, 463 F.2d at 1321-22 ("Pursuant to the Survival Statute, we think it
is proper for the estate of the deceased to recover an amount based on probable net future earnings, discounted to present worth . . . . ").
See Criscuola, 507 P.2d at 150-51 (holding that all personal injury causes of action survive including damages for loss of prospective earnings).
See id. at 150.
[d.
See id.
See Krawill Mach. Corp. v. Rubert C. Herd & Co., 145 F. Supp. 554, 559 (D.
Md. 1956) ("The general rule is that a person is liable for all pecuniary damages proximately caused by any negligence with which he is chargeable.").
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that person for those future lost earnings. 181 Consequently, when a
person dies due to another's negligence, it is only equitable that the
estate be allowed to recover future lost earnings in a survival action. 182 Allowing a tortfeasor to escape liability creates a windfall for
the tortfeasor. 183
The Jones court's holding was improper and evidenced the
court's confusion regarding recovery under the wrongful death statute and the survival statute, despite ·the lengthy discussion of the issue in Stewart. 184 The court mistakenly assumed that a remedy for
the parents would somehow compensate for all of the damage from
the victim's death, resulting in a windfall for the tortfeasor. 185 The
court incorrectly equated the right to recover certain damages
under the wrongful death statute as being sufficient compensation
for the loss sustained by the estate under the survival statute. 186 The
181. See id.
182. See Karl L. Rubinstein, Personal Injuries and the Texas Survival Statute: The Case
for Recavery of Damages for Decedent's Lost Future Earnings, 12 ST. MARy's LJ. 49,
54 (1980) (stating that the estate suffers economic harm and financial loss
due to loss of future earnings). Since the primary reason for recovering damages is to compensate for a loss caused by someone else, it is only fair that
the estate be allowed to recover those losses it has suffered. See 8 M.L.E. Damages § 4 (1985). Maryland Law Encyclopedia states:
The primary object of an award of damages in a civil action, and the
theory upon which it is based, is just compensation or indemnity for
the loss or injury sustained, so that the injured party may be made
whole, and restored, as nearly as possible, to the position or condition he was in prior to the i~ury.
Id. (citing Weishaar v. Canestrale, 241 Md. 676, 217 A.2d 525 (1966); Kahn v.
Carl Schoen Silk Corp., 147 Md. 516, 128 A. 359 (1925); 25 CJ.S. Damages § 3
(1966».
183. See Rubinstein, supra note 182, at 67 ("Unless the estate is allowed to recover
for the net lost future earnings that would have been contributed to it, then
[the] law would be allowing only a 'fractional recovery.' A fractional recovery
should be as abhorrent as a double recovery or triple recovery."); see also
Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 159, 297 A.2d 721, 727 (1972)
(" '[I]f a wrongdoer may be punished if his victim lives, then surely he should
not escape the retribution if his wrongful act causes a death.''' (quoting
Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424, 425 (E.D. Iowa 1967»).
184. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 339, 65 A. 49, 52
(1906) (stating that the survival statute and wrongful death statute are two
separate and distinct actions and allow for separate and distinct recoveries).
185. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, l31, 716 A.2d 285,290 (1998).
186. See Biro v. Schombert, 41 Md. App. 658, 666, 398 A.2d 519, 524 (1979) (inferring that the fact that parents are not without a remedy means that they will
be adequately compensated).
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Stewart court made clear that actions created by the two statutes are
distinct. 187 Recovery under one statute does not preclude recovery
under the other. Therefore, not only is there a windfall to the
wrongdoer, but there exists insufficient compensation to the decedent's estate.
Also, when a tortfeasor causes the death of another, and therefore causes a total loss of all future earnings, not only has the decedent suffered a loss, but the estate of the decedent has also suffered
a 10SS.188 If the victim lives, then that person will be able to recover
future lost earnings in a personal injury action to the ultimate benefit of the estate. 189 However, if the person dies before bringing that
cause of action, then the estate will not be entitled to recover for
that 10SS.19O The subsequent death of the individual should not be
grounds for denying the estate recovery. 191
Finally, the Stewart court concluded that the Legislature
adopted the survival statute to provide recovery for losses not allowed under the wrongful death statute. i92 Under the latter statute,
the only losses recoverable for a wrongful or negligent death are
those suffered by others as a result of the death. 193 These losses do
not include future lost earnings sustained by the deceased. 194 How187. See Stewart, 104 Md. at 339, 65 A. at 52 ("The suits are by different persons,
the damages go into different channels and are recovered upon different
grounds, and the causes of action, though growing out of the same wrongful
act or neglect, are entirely distinct.").
188. See Rubinstein, supra note 182, at 54 (stating that future lost earnings are a
loss to the estate causing economic harm and financial loss).
189. See Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 274, 280, 623 A.2d 656, 659 (1993).
190. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 131,716 A.2d 285, 290 (1998).
191. See Stewart, 104 Md. at 344, 65 A. at 54 ('" [I]f a person be wrongfully injured,
the pain and suffering and expense to him in consequence thereof shall not
be lost to his estate by the circumstance of his death from the injury before
receiving satisfaction for his damages ... .'" (quoting Brown v. Chicago N.W.
Ry. Co., 78 N.W. 771, 777 (Wis. 1899»); see also Rubinstein, supra note 182, at
55.
192. See Stewart, 104 Md. at 339, 65 A. at 52 (stating that it is presumed that the
legislature intended, by the enactment of the survival statute, to give a remedy
for injuries which the wrongful death statute did not provide).
193. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904 (1998); ACandS, Inc. v. Asner,
104 Md. App. 608, 645, 657 A.2d 379, 397 (1995) (noting that in a wrongful
death action, damages are measured in terms of harm to others from the loss
of the decedent); see also discussion supra Part lILA (discussing losses recoverable under the wrongful death statute).
194. See ACandS, 104 Md. App. at 643-45, 657 A.2d at 39&.97. Section 3-904 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article does provide that future lost earnings
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ever, the survival statute does provide recovery for these losses. 195
Therefore, if the courts do not allow the estate to recover future
lost earnings in a survival action, a loss would exist that is neither
recoverable under the wrongful death statute nor the survival statute. It would be a grave disservice for Maryland courts to continue
to allow such a loss to go unrecovered because" [t]he fundamental
goal of tort recovery is compensation of the victim, i.e., to put the
victim, insofar as money damages may do so, in the position he
would have been absent the tort."196

VII. PROBLEMS NOTED BY MARYLAND COURTS ARE NOT AN
ISSUE WITH THIS SUGGESTED APPROACH
The Jones decision appears well-supported and reasoned, given
the decisions leading up to it. 197 Unfortunately, just as earlier Maryland courts had done, the Jones court adopted a judicially created
doctrine contrary to legislative intent, confused and misapplied the
related, but separate and distinct, wrongful death and survival statutes, and adhered to judicial precedents resulting in inequitable
and unjust consequences. In fact, the Jones court used a hypothetical similar to the one at the beginning of this Comment,198 yet did
not recognize the inequitable and unjust results it demonstrated. l99
Therefore, the justification for changing the law becomes even
clearer after addressing the problems which surfaced as a result of
the Jones decision.

195.
196.

197.
198.
199.

are included in the evaluation of damages. However, they are limited to the
amount of loss of support that the claimant has suffered as a result of the
person's death. See Metzger v. Steamship Kristen Torm, 245 F. Supp. 227, 234 (D.
Md. 1965) (explaining that damages may be awarded under the wrongful
death statute to a widow for both present and future pecuniary losses suffered
by her as a result of the death of her husband). Therefore, the loss of support suffered by those other than the deceased is different and distinct from
the loss of future earnings suffered by the deceased, and recovery for that loss
does not equate with compensation for any loss suffered by the deceased. See
Stewart, 104 Md. at 339, 65 A. at 52.
See discussion supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
Tucker v. Calmar Steamship Corp., 356 F. Supp. 709, 711 (D. Md. 1973) (citing 25 C.J.S. Damages § 71, at 836 (1966); 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING
JAMESJR., THE LAw OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1299 (1956».
See discussion supra Part V.
See supra Part I.
See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 131-32,716 A.2d 285, 290 (1998) (stating that
if a person lives to the date of judgment in a personal i~ury action, the person may recover future lost earnings; but if a person dies before judgment,
there are no future lost earnings damages).
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Double Recovery

The court in Jones concluded that if losses for future earnings
were recoverable in survival actions, double recovery would be possible. 2°O The Stewart court first embraced the decision to limit damages recoverable in a survival action to those between the time of
injury and the time of death to prevent duplicating damages. 201 Unfortunately, the Stewart court misapplied the notion of double recovery with regard to the survival and wrongful death actions, as did
the court in Jones.
In general, double recovery occurs when the plaintiff recovers
twice for the same wrong or for the same element of damage. 202 For
example, in a personal injury action, if a plaintiff is awarded damages for both impairment of her ability to earn money and for impairment of her physical ability to perform certain tasks, no double
recovery would occur, as both essentially amount to "lost future
earnings. "203
However, recovery of future lost earnings in a survival action is
different. Both the wrongful death beneficiaries and the decedent's
estate are entitled to recover for that loss, because both have been
deprived of the benefits of the decedent's future earnings. 204 To allow the wrongful death beneficiaries to recover, but not the decedent's estate, results in a windfall to the tortfeasor, while the estate
receives only a fractional recovery.205 Therefore, the limitation
placed on recovery of damages in a survival action has no effect on
preventing double recovery; rather it causes the decedent's estate to
recover only a fraction of its actual loss. A fractional recovery is just
as intolerable as a double recovery, or worse, since the primary pur200. See id. at 125, 716 A.2d at 287 (stating that if loss of future earnings was recoverable, there would be a "high risk of duplicating the damages in a companion wrongful death case").
20l. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 344, 65 A. 49, 54
(1906) (stating that in order to prevent defendants from being exposed to a
danger of injustice, meaning double recovery, the damages under the survival
statute must be limited to those sustained between time of injury and time of
death).
202. See Shapiro v. Chapman, 70 Md. App. 307, 315, 520 A.2d 1330, 1334 (1987)
(stating that a plaintiff may not recover twice for the same tort).
203. Rubinstein, supra note 182, at 66-67 (providing a similar example of a plaintiff
unable to recover for the same tort).
204. See id. at 67 (noting that while a defendant should not be required to pay mom
than once for the same element of damage, a tortfeasor, nevertheless, should
be required to pay once for each element of damage).
205. See id.
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pose of recovery of damages is to be compensated justly and fairly
for the losses sustained as a result of another's acts. 206
Furthermore, the limitation applied by the court in Stewart is
unsound given the court's own conclusion that both the wrongful
death statute and the survival statute create two distinct causes of
action that provide for two separate recoveries. 207 By their very nature, damages recovered under one would not overlap with damages recovered under the other.208
By holding that damages for future lost earnings are not recoverable in a survival action, Maryland courts have not followed the
letter of the personal representative statute. 209 That statute expressly
grants personal representatives the right to recover all damages "recoverable in the action; "210 there is no limitation in the statute.
The Jones court specifically misapplied Maryland's survivor statute,211 limiting the type of damages recoverable, by precluding a
personal representative's recovery of future lost earnings. 212 The
court's rationale for limiting survival action damages to only those
incurred between the time of injury and death was that if an award
of damages were extended beyond death, the type of damages
awarded would overlap with those damages recoverable under the
wrongful death statute. 213
The court of appeals contended that the estate's attempt to recover future lost earnings suffered by the deceased was actually the
206. See Tucker v. Calmar Steamship Corp., 356 F. Supp 709, 711 (D. Md. 1973)
(noting that the fundamental goal of tort recovery is compensation of the victim); 25 CJ.S. Damages § 3, at 626 (1966) (stating that the primary object of
civil damages awards is just compensation).
207. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 339, 65 A. 49, 52
(1906).
208. See id. at 342-44, 65 A. at 53-54 (clarifying that the two actions accomplish different results and are for the benefit of wholly different persons, thereby the
satisfaction of one can in no way affect the other); see also discussion supra
Part VI.C.
209. See MD. CODE ANN .. EST. & TRUSTS § 7401(y) (Supp. 1999).
210. [d.
211. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6401 (1998).
212. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 131-32,716 A.2d 285,290 (1998) (refusing to
expand the damages recoverable in a survival action beyond death).
213. See id. at 125, 716 A.2d at 287 (stating that the court declines to include postdeath lost earnings in a survival action because the change would involve a
high risk of duplication of the damages in a companion wrongful death action); Stewart, 104 Md. at 344, 65 A. at 54 (stating that the defendant will not
be exposed to any injustice, meaning double recovery, because the recovery is
limited to the loss actually sustained by the deceased prior to death).
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estate's attempt to recover damages only intended for designated
beneficiaries. 214 The court made it clear that the legislature created
a class of individuals who were permitted to recover a decedent's future lost earnings under the wrongful death statute, and an attempt
to recover those future lost earnings in a survival action undermined that limitation. 215 Here, the court misapplied and confused
the two statutes.
Because a wrongful death action and a survival action are separate and distinct causes of action,216 it follows that no where does recovery under one overlap with recovery under the other.217 Put another way, an attempt to recover certain damages under the survival
statute is separate and distinct from an attempt to recover certain
damages under the wrongful death statute. 218 Therefore, the court
incorrectly stated that the estate's attempt to recover future lost
earnings in a survival action is actually an attempt to recover damages only permitted under the wrongful death statute. 219
The rationale for allowing recovery of future lost wages and
further dispelling the fear of double recovery is found in Monias v.
Endal,220 a case decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals in 1993.
In Monias, the court decided whether an award for future lost earnings due to premature death was recoverable. 221 The court distinguished a "personal injury" action from a wrongful death action. 222
That distinction is critical because, in contrast to a wrongful death
214. See Jones, 351 Md. at 128-29, 716 A.2d at 289 (stating that because the legislature has limited who may and may not recover post-death earnings by way of
the wrongful death statute, a survival action for loss of future earnings is an
"end-run around" that limitation in an effort to collect post-death earnings).
215. See id. (stating that the Jones's action is an attempt to undermine the legislatively imposed limitation).
216. See supra Part IV.
217. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 34344, 65 A. 49,
54 (1906) (stating that since a wrongful death action and survival action are
separate and distinct causes of action which allow for the recovery of damages
for two separate and different types of losses that are sustained by two separate and distinct classes of persons, then recovery under one can in no way affect the other).
218. See id. (stating that "neither of those actions is the alternative of, or substitute
for, the other").
219. See id. at 344, 65 A. at 54 (stating that the estate will not lose any recovery on
a survival action if the estate subsequently pursues a wrongful death action).
220. 330 Md. 274, 623 A.2d 656 (1993).
221. See id. at 279, 623 A.2d at 658.
222. See id.

1999]

Decedent's Future Lost Earnings

131

action, among the possible types of survival actions is a personal injury action initiated or continued by the estate administrator.
In Monias, the personal injury action was initiated while the
tort victim was alive.223 The court recognized the potential for
double recovery if the victim's husband was awarded damages for
"loss of support" in a wrongful death action.224 Rather than shy
away from providing a just recovery for this victim, the court merely
espoused that the "plaintiff's recovery in this action will obviously
preclude a subsequent claim for loss of support in a wrongful death
action for at least the same years included in the lost earnings
award. "225 The court of appeals felt no need to establish a rigid
formula to ensure that double recovery did not occur.
In addition, the court considered whether the plaintiff could
recover "loss of income" for the "lost years," i.e., the years between
the plaintiff's premature death and the normal expected retirement
age. 226 Despite an earlier ruling that a plaintiff was not generally entitled to "lost years" recovery, the court determined the proper
measure of damages to be the "loss of earnings based on the plaintiff's life expectancy had the tortious conduct not occurred, rather
than loss of earnings based on the plaintiff's post-tort shortened life
expectancy. "227 The court further reasoned that it could not "permit
the tortfeasor to reduce liability . . . by reducing the victim's life
expectancy. "228
In sum, a double recovery exists when a defendant pays twice
for the same loss. The survival statute and the wrongful death statute
provide for recovery of two different 10sses.229 Therefore, allowing
wrongful death beneficiaries to recover the loss of the decedent's
future earnings, and allowing the decedent's estate to recover the
loss of the decedent's future lost earnings, will not lead to a double
recovery.230

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See id. at 276, 623 A.2d at 657.
See id. at 279-80, 623 A.2d at 658.
[d.

See id. at 28(}'81, 623 A.2d at 659.
[d. at 281, 623 A.2d at 659 (noting that in the previous holding, the specific
issue of "lost earnings" was not before the court).
228. [d. at 282, 623 A.2d at 660.
229. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 343, 65 A. 49, 53
(1906).
230. See Rubinstein, supra note 182, at 67-68.
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B. Courts Accept and Encourage Deviation From Well-Established Law
Adherence Is Unsound or No Longer Suitable

If

The principle of stare decisis is a policy whereby courts adhere
to precedent rather than departing from settled points of law.23i
This principle affords certainty and stability in the law.232 However,
where the rule has become unsound and no longer suitable, the
court may, and should, ignore the doctrine and depart from settled
law. 233
Currently, future lost earnings are not recoverable in a survival
action. 234 However, because further adherence to this law leads to
fractional recovery for the decedent's estate and allows the
tortfeasor a windfall, a change in the law is necessary, despite the
importance of stare decisis.235
Maryland courts have used varying rationales for changing common-law principles. For instance, Maryland courts have relied upon
legislative public policy pronouncements in statutes to uphold deci231. See 7 M.L.E. Courts § 52 (1985); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
The doctrine of stare decisis reflects a "policy which entails the reaffirmation
of a decisional doctrine of an appellate court, even though if considered for
the first time, the Court [sic] might reach a different conclusion." See Harrison v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 458, 456 A.2d 894, 902
(1983).
232. See Post v. Bregman, 112 Md. App. 738, 761, 686 A.2d 665, 676 (1996) (stating
that the doctrine of stare decisis allows society to take comfort in knowing
what the law is, and what it will be in the future); Harrison, 295 Md. at 458-59,
456 A.2d at 902 (stating that stare decisis exists for certainty and stability);
Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 102, 231 A.2d 514, 518 (1966)
(stating that, for certainty and stability, the doctrine of stare decisis is invoked, usually leaving changes to the Legislature).
233. See Post, 112 Md. App. at 761, 686 A.2d at 675 (stating that stare decisis directs
courts to avoid disturbing precedent unless the rule of law has become unsound and no longer suitable); Harrison, 295 Md. at 459,456 A.2d at 903 (stating that stare decisis does not prevent the court from changing a common-law
rule where in light of changed circumstances or knowledge, the rule has become unsound or no longer suitable); Pride Mark Realty v. Mullins, 30 Md.
App. 497, 506, 352 A.2d 866, 871 (1976) (stating that the doctrine of stare decisis is not to be followed if the court is shown that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life); see also White v. King, 244 Md.
·348, 355, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1965) (stating that in determining whether a law
should be changed, the courts should consider the law's application on a
case-by-case basis, look at whether different factual situations present new difficulties to be resolved, and whether there exist new factors to be weighed).
234. See Jones, 351 Md. at 131, 716 A.2d at 290.
235. See supra notes 183, 231-34 and accompanying text.
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sions modifying the common law. 236 At other times, the courts have
looked solely to the persuasive authority of secondary sources and
other jurisdictions to alter previously held common-law principles. 237
At times, judges refuse to change a common-law principle
under stare decisis or because they recognize that it is the legislature's role to declare public policy, and that decisions to alter such
legal principles should be left to the Maryland General Assembly.238
Maryland courts rely on the presumption that legislators are aware
of judicial statutory interpretations, and thereby acquiesce when
they do not overturn such judicial interpretations. 239 This presumption is strengthened when a statute is re-enacted, following judicial
interpretation, without substantive change. 240 At times, the Maryland
courts have assumed, and not merely presumed, that General Assembly inaction indicates an intent to maintain the status quo, because
the legislators were "certainly aware" of the judicial arguments advanced for changing the common law, but chose not to act despite
"repeated reminders of [their] role in the matter."241
This presumption is not a universal view, and even the United
States Supreme Court has cautioned against reading too much into
legislative inaction, especially when legislators do not provide an ex-

236. See McGarvey v. McGarvey, 286 Md. 19, 27-28, 405 A.2d 250, 254-55 (1979) (relying upon the statutory acceptance that a prior criminal conviction does not
necessarily equate to lack of witness veracity to remove the common-law bar
for persons with a prior criminal conviction from performing a will attestation) .
237. See Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 564, 380 A.2d 611, 613 (1977) (upholding the
decision, based on the lower court's rationale, to allow a tort action solely for
intentional infliction of emotional distress). The court of special appeals
based its conclusion upon the policy reasons in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and the court of appeals dually noted that this change would be consistent with 37 other jurisdictions. See id. at 564, 380 A.2d at 613.
238. See Harrison, 295 Md. at 460, 456 A.2d at 903 (listing various cases supporting
this proposition and the particular common-law rule left unchanged).
239. See Sandford v. Maryland Police Training and Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md.
374, 383, 697 A.2d 424, 428 (quoting "had the legislature intended to include
... [it] within the terms of the statute, it would have done so, and since it
did not, the implication is that ... [it was] purposefully excluded" (citations
omitted».
240. See Workers' Compensation Comm. v. Driver, 336 Md. 105, 121, 647 A.2d 96,
104 (1994).
241. Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 55-56, 405 A.2d 255, 257 (1979) (supporting this assertion of the legislators' awareness by noting numerous cases
abrogating the common-law sovereign immunity doctrine).
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planation for this inaction. 242 The Supreme Court reasoned that
lack of repudiation by Congress of the Court's decision did not
"serve as an implied instruction by Congress to us not to reconsider, in the light of new experience, whether those decisions" remain sound. 243
The court in Jones rejected the plaintiff's attempt to change the
law in Maryland so that future lost earnings would be recoverable,
because the change would "effect a substantial upheaval in wellestablished Maryland law, contrary to the stare decisis principle . . . . "244 Although such change would cause a substantial deviation from well-established law, it is nonetheless necessary and compelling in light of the inequitable and unjust results that adherence
to the law continues to create.
Certainly, if stare decisis was a simple concept to apply, the
conclusion would suggest placing pressure on the legislators to provide statutory relief that values the victim's interest over the
tortfeasor's. But stare decisis is not a simple, "one-size fits all"
doctrine. 245
242. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940) (categorizing this as a
"venture into speculative unrealities").
243. [d. at 119 (stating that "[i]t would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this Court from re-examining its own
doctrines").
244. See Jones, 351 Md. at 125,716 A.2d at 287.
245. See, e.g, Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, Inc., 249 Md. 233, 238 A.2d
863 (1968) (refusing to abrogate the common-law charitable immunity rule
noting that the 1947 General Assembly refused to adopt House Bill 99,
preventing a charitable institution from using the immunity defense, and noting that, where "present statutes are tangible evidence" that after careful investigation the legislature "arrived at a solution [they] deemed satisfactory,"
the court is not at liberty to change this public policy pronouncement); Joyce
v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951) (emphasizing the General Assembly's resistance to change the contributory negligence doctrine by rejecting 21
legislative bills over the course of 17 years as indicating a clearly announced
public policy decision). But see Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 273-74, 462
A.2d 506, 521-22 (1983) (where the court of appeals willingly accepted the
challenge to look to changed circumstances and decided that the common
law was unsound in light of modem life); Harrison, 295 Md. at 461 n.12, 456
A.2d at 904 n.12 (listing cases where the common law was changed or supplemented despite legislative inaction); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291
Md. 31, 45, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981) (determining that they were not restricted to find public policy pronouncements in "legislative enactments, prior
judicial decisions or administrative regulations," the Adler court did recommend caution when adopting previously "undeclared public policy"); Lewis v.
State, 285 Md. 705, 709, 404 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1975) (finding no reason to be
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Refuting the stare decisis argument becomes easier when the
trend among other jurisdictions is to abrogate the common law. 246
In Luslly v. LUSlly,247 the court held the common-law spousal immunity doctrine inapplicable to an intentional tort case because many
jurisdictions had abrogated the doctrine, since the issue was first decided in that state ten years earlier.248 Notably, the court, relying on
trends among other jurisdictions, specifically addressed the public
policy concerns against reducing tortfeasor liability.
This result is consistent with the general principle that if tortious injury exists, there should be recovery, and only strong public
policy arguments should justify judicially created immunity for
tortfeasors, and a bar to recovery for injured victims. 249
When dealing with a judicially created legal principle, where
public policy srongly demands a change to avoid an illogical result,
legislative inaction cannot be allowed to immobilize the judicial system. To accomplish the task before them, judges should analyze
"the public policy concerns raised by the parties and by the other
courts which have grappled with th[e] issue."25o
The distinguishing feature in this instance is that the wrongful
death and survival statutes at issue were enacted many years ago
and have continued without substantive changes for over a century.
These are not statutes under constant review; legislation attempting
to alter their provisions is not frequently introduced. Courts continue to deny lost wages in a survival action by hiding behind the
stare decisis "legislative inaction" cloak, repeatedly relying upon
dicta made by a court at the turn of the twentieth century.251 Princi-

246.

247.
248.
249.
250.

251.

bound by stare decisis when the changed conditions and illogical result of the
common-law principle mandated such action, and noting that Maryland was
the only jurisdiction holding onto the common-law procedural rule under the
accessoryship doctrine, precluding accessory adjudication before sentencing a
principal) .
See Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334,34647, 390 A.2d 77, 82-83 (1978). Due to the
division among judicial decisions, the Lusby court also relied upon the "nearly
unanimous" opinions of professional commentators criticizing the spousal immunity doctrine. Id. at 350, 390 A.2d at 84.
283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978).
See id.
See id. at 347, 390 A.2d at 83 (quoting Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532
(Mass. 1976».
Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 30, 557 A.2d 210, 217 (1989) (continuing to develop the judiciary's role of discerning social policy).
See State v. Wilson, 106 Md. App. 24, 39, 664 A.2d 1, 8 (1995) (suggesting that
dicta "should be given the weight [such words] would be given if the judge
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pIes of public policy should guide the courts, rather than placing
continued emphasis upon the doctrine of stare decisis, a principle
which, in this instance, ignores the changed circumstances of modern life.

C.

The Court of Appeals Previously Adopted Similar Reasoning

The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe
CO.,252 determined that punitive damages are recoverable by a personal representative in a survival action, utilizing the same reasoning proposed here.253 Smith involved a personal injury action
brought by the personal representative of the deceased's estate
under the survival statute. 254 The personal representative, the parent
of a minor child killed in an automobile accident, brought suit
against a corporate defendant and its employee. 255 The suit was
based on the negligent entrustment of the employee with a company truck, and the personal representative sought damages from
the company through respondeat superior. 256 The personal representative also sought the recovery of punitive damages.257
The court observed that neither the survival statute, nor the
personal representative statute, mentioned the type of damages recoverable by the personal representative in a survival action for personal injuries. 258 However, the court applied the legal principles set

252.
253.

254.
255.
256.

257.

258.

had said them in a law review article or in a newspaper colum or in a talk to
the Kiwanis Club"). In Wilson the court stated, "stare decisis is ill-served if
readers hang slavishly on every casual or hurried word as if it had bubbled
from the earth at Delphi. Obiter dicta, if noticed at all, should be taken with
a large grain of salt." Id.
267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).
See id. at 160, 297 A.2d at 727 ("[W]e hold that a personal representative may
recover exemplary damages in those cases where they might have been
awarded to the decedent, whose estate he administers, had the former
survived. ") .
See id. at 152-53, 297 A.2d at 724.
See id. at 152-53, 297 A.2d at 723-24.
See id. See generally BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "respondeat superior" as the common-law doctrine "holding an employer or
principal liable for the employee'S or agent's wrongful acts committed within
the scope of the employment or agency").
See Smith, 267 Md. at 152-53, 297 A.2d at 723-24. The court allowed the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages for negligently entrusting the employee, an
18 year old, with a truck that was in a well-documented state of disrepair. See
id. at 168, 297 A.2d at 732-33.
See id. at 158, 297 A.2d at 727.
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forth by the court earlier in Stewart,259 holding that, because punitive damages were recoverable by a tort victim in a personal injury
action if the victim survived and brought the action herself, then
punitive damages were likewise recoverable by a personal representative bringing a personal injury action under the survival statute. 260
This is precisely the same legal analysis advocated with future lost
earnings. 261 Because damages for future lost earnings are recoverable by a tort victim in the victim's own personal injury action, then
these damages should similarly be recoverable by the victim's estate
in a personal injury action brought under the survival statute. 262

VIII. CONCLUSION
Maryland courts created an injustice in the area of damages
with the decisions of Stewart and Jones. 263 The court refused to extend the recovery of future lost earnings to a decedent's estate
under a survival statute. 264 The current law allows a tortfeasor who
fatally injures someone to reap a windfall that would otherwise not
occur had the victim been injured and survived. 265
In view of the clear and unambiguous language of the survival
and personal representative statutes266 and of the unjust and inequitable results that are possible under the current state of Maryland
law,267 future lost earnings should be recoverable by the personal
representative in a personal injury action under the survival statute. 268 The clear language of the statutes does not limit the types of
actions that survive, nor limits the types of damages recoverable in a
survival action, and it is improper for Maryland courts to continue
to create a limitation contrary to the clear statutory language. 269 In
addition, death results in the total diminishment of earnings. There
is no logical reason to allow recovery for funeral expenses, yet not
259.
260.
261.
262.

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
See Smith, 267 Md. at 160, 297 A.2d at 727.
See supra Part V.
See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 34243, 65 A. 49,
53 (1906) (holding that damages recoverable under a survival statute are
those which the deceased might have recovered had he lived and brought the
action himself).
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part lV.A-B.
See supra Part lV.D.
See supra Part lV.B.
See supra Part VI.
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allow for recovery of future lost earnings-both are losses to the
estate. 270
Simple syllogistic reasoning leads to the conclusion that future
lost earnings damages should be recoverable in a survival action.
The Maryland General Assembly decided that actions should survive
a person's death and granted the decedent's personal representatives the right to commence an action to recover those damages
which could have been recovered had the deceased survived.271 For
example, in an action for personal injury, if the deceased survived,
the deceased would have been able to recover damages for future
lost earnings. 272 Therefore, it follows that the personal representative should be permitted to recover those future lost earnings in the
survival action.
If one were to analyse the statute today, without the judicial
gloss, there would be only one interpretation. The conclusion that
"lost earnings" are available in a survival action is evident, looking
at the express language of section 6401, allowing survival of a personal injury cause of action; section 7-401 (y), granting the estate administrator the power to commence a personal injury action on behalf of the decedent; and section 11-109, providing not only for lost
wages in a personal injury award, but also for payment to the decedent's estate in the event of death. Giving an executor the power to
commence a "personal injury" action and providing the victim's estate with a mechanism to recover unpaid damages, necessitates all
remedies to be included in a survival action that would be available
to a living victim, including future lost earnings.
Eric W. Gunderson

270. See supra Part III.
271. See supra Part II.B.
272. See supra notes 66-69, 80 and accompanying text.

